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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880406-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Issues, Statement of the Case, and 
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Brief of Appellant at pages 
vi through 8. Appellant takes this opportunity to respond briefly 
to the State's answer. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because identification was the critical issue in the 
case, the prosecutorfs comment in his opening statement that his 
witness identified Mr. Quintanta as the man in the alley, despite a 
court order suppressing that evidence, probably influenced the 
jury's decision and thereby demands reversal of the convictions. 
The State failed to provide sufficient evidence that 
Mr. Quintana committed the crimes of Burglary and Theft. 
The giving of Instruction No. 19 over objection was 
without factual basis and eliminated the State's burden to prove 
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt contrary to due 
process standards. The State relies on cases which are 
distinguishable from the case at bar. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT PREJUDICED 
MR, QUINTANA'S RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TRIAL 
REQUIRING REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS, 
The State concedes that the prosecutor inappropriately 
introduced to the jurors through his opening statement the 
previously suppressed identification of Mr. Quintana by Mr. Rains. 
Brief of Respondent at 12. Notably, the State does not challenge 
the correctness of the trial court's decision granting the motion to 
suppress that identification. Rather, the State claims that the 
prosecutor's error was harmless. Brief of Respondent at 12. 
The State contends that the prosecutor's behavior must be 
tolerated because (1) jurors were informed that statements by 
counsel are not evidence and (2) substantial evidence to support the 
conviction was established at trial. Brief of Respondent at 15-16. 
Both arguments fail to squarely analyze the facts of this case under 
the standard announced by the Utah Supreme Court for determining 
whether reversal is required. 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), is dispositive 
of this issue. In Troy, the Supreme Court found that a prosecutor's 
opening statement comments attacking the defendant's use of an alias 
(his former legal name) and his involvement in a federal witness 
protection program called the jurors' attention to matters outside 
the evidence. icL at 485-86. Notably, the fact that the trial 
court expressly admonished the jurors to disregard the particular 
statements, as opposed to the generalized instruction by the court 
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in this case, was not curative of the error; nor should it be here. 
Such admonitions do not play a role in the analysis established by 
the Court.1 
Next, the Troy Court examined the second prong of the 
test—whether the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, probably were influenced by the improper remarks—and 
clarified the test. The Court indicated that step two requires an 
examination of the circumstances of the case as a whole. Troy, 688 
P.2d at 486. The Court noted: 
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial. Likewise, in a case with less 
compelling proof, this Court will more closely 
scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the 
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is greater likelihood that 
they will be improperly influenced through remarks 
of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may 
be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of 
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Critically important in the 
Court's explanation is that no deference is given to the jury's 
verdict; rather, the more conflicting the evidence and/or the more 
1 The Court ruled in Troy that the first prong was 
clearly met. 688 P.2d at 486. The comments of the prosecutor in 
Troy are less egregious than those at issue here. Here the comments 
directly identified criminality rather than merely inferencing 
suggestively criminal behavior as in Troy. Perhaps more 
importantly, here the prosecutor's comments violated a pretrial 
suppression order; no such orders were at issue in Troy. Arguably, 
this distinction alone should encourage this Court to avoid 
tolerating the prosecutor's behavior allowing a finding that 
Mr. Quintana did not receive a fair trial as guaranteed by due 
process strictures. 
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susceptible the evidence is of differing interpretations, then the 
greater the likelihood of influence by the remarks. Accordingly, 
the State's analysis of this second prong of the test erroneously 
references their second point addressing the sufficiency of the 
evidence. When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, it is 
proper that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict, including reasonable inferences. See, e.g., 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). When analyzing the 
second prong of Troy, the proper view is to focus on the 
susceptibility of the evidence to differing interpretations. If the 
evidence arguably supports either position—innocence or guilt—then 
the comments at issue may tip the balance inappropriately affecting 
the jury's decision and mandating reversal. Troy, 688 P.2d at 
486-87. 
Under the circumstances of this particular case, the 
second prong is met such that jurors were likely affected by the 
prosecutor's improper statement that Mr. Rains had seen Mr. Quintana 
come out of the alley behind the John home with something tucked 
underneath his shirt. This case is an identification case as 
unquestionably conceded by all. The prosecutor stated, "The 
ultimate issue in this case is, of course, whether or not [the 
person Mr. Rains followed] was the defendant" (R. 118 at 20). Later 
he again stated, "The only real issue in this particular case seems 
to be the question of who is responsible for that criminal conduct 
[—the Burglary and Theft]" (R. 119 at 73). The defense attorney 
stated, "When the question is identification, how prejudiced can a 
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defendant get when Mr. Jones tells the jury that Mr. Rains saw the 
defendant. I can't say it any more bluntly than that. The question 
is identification" (R. 118 at 21). In its brief, the State also 
concedes the point by stating, "The major issue before the jury and 
now on appeal is simply identification." Brief of Respondent at 18. 
Therefore, when the prosecutor, contrary to the trial 
court's suppression order, impermissibly informed the jury that his 
witness saw Mr. Quintana in that alley with something under his 
shirt, the jurors heard information they were not entitled to hear 
which probably influenced their verdict. The jurors were probably 
influenced by the remarks they were not justified in hearing because 
those remarks provided the critical connection that no other witness 
or evidence could provide. 
Mrs. Rains, even assuming her testimony to be credible, 
could only place Mr. Quintana on the front porch; she could not 
place him either in the premises nor with stolen property (R. 118 at 
56-80). The most damaging physical evidence presented at the trial 
was the patch cords. The testimony introduced by opposing sides on 
this issue was, at a minimum, conflicting and susceptible of 
different interpretations such that the improper remarks of the 
prosecutor likely came into play and tipped the balance permitting 
the jury to more readily accept the State's version and return 
convictions on the charges. 
Finally, an examination of the State's arguments on the 
sufficiency of the evidence encounters all the inferences and 
explanations the jury must have made to return guilty verdicts: 
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i.e., discrepancies in physical description, clothing colors, 
automobile license plate discrepancy, broken versus missing front 
grill on the truck, difficulties with recalling the basis of ability 
to identify Mr. Quintana, difficulties with physical capacities to 
identify, etc.) Brief of Respondent at 19-20. The jury could have 
easily decided the other way on any or all of these considerations. 
Therefore, the critical and determinative difference was the 
statement of the prosecutor providing actual identification which 
was erroneously before the jurors and which they probably used for 
"guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence." Troy, 688 at 
486. Accordingly, reversal of Mr. Quintana's convictions are 
required under State v. Troy. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF 
MR. QUINTANA. 
Despite conceding the critical issue of the case to be 
identification (Brief of Respondent at 18), the State maintains that 
the facts sufficiently support the convictions against 
Mr. Quintana. The State relies heavily on the testimony of 
Mrs. Rains, the presence of the patch cords in the pickup truck 
belonging to Mr. Quintana's brother, and various inferences from the 
evidence. Such reliance is misplaced and inadequate to sustain the 
convictions. 
Mr. Quintana insists that his opening brief adequately 
challenges the sufficiency of evidence. He responds here only to 
clarify several points presented by the State. 
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The State claims that Mrs. Rains recognized the defendant 
and his truck. Brief of Respondent at 19 (citing R. 118 at 59-61, 
68). The record belies that claim. 
Additionally, the State claims that Mrs. Rains saw 
Mr. Quintana often on her way to work and specifically a few days 
prior to the crime. Brief of Respondent at 19 (citing R. 118 at 
68-70). Again, the record belies the claim. When more closely 
examined, the record on this point supports the inaccuracy of 
Mrs. Rains1 identification. 
While defense counsel's initial question focused on prior 
to the crime, Mrs. Rains did not respond that she saw him two or 
three days before the crime; she stated she saw him "two or three 
days ago," meaning before the trial (R. 118 at 69). Counsel 
carefully clarified that response. 
Q. . . . When was the last time, prior to that, 
that you had seen the person that you thought was 
Andy Quintana? 
A. Oh, maybe a few days ago, because I drive up 
and down. 
Q. Two or three days ago? 
A. Two or three days ago. 
Q. Where was this place that you thought you saw 
Andy Quintana two or three days ago? 
A. On 9th West. 
Q. 9th West? (R. 118 at 69) 
Mrs. Rains could not have seen Mr. Quintana two or three days before 
the trial because he was not out on bail; he was incarcerated at the 
- 7 -
Utah State Prison (R. 04, 39, 42, 44, 45, 47).2 As the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986), 
"[T]he accuracy of an identification is at times inversely related 
to the confidence with which it is made." Moreover, Mrs. Rains' 
testimony can be likened to that of Mrs. H. in State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), where the Supreme Court noted that "her 
testimony exhibited a strong motivation to distort her 
recollection . . . in order to ensure [the] conviction[s] ." _I_d. at 
197. 
Finally, the State finds it interesting that Mr. Quintana 
failed in his opening brief to acknowledge in either .the facts or 
the argument the "plausible explanation of identification" offered 
by Mrs. Rains. Brief of Respondent at 19 n.5. It is the State's 
characterization of Mrs. Rains1 alternative explanations of 
identification as "plausible" wherein the dispute lies. "Plausible" 
is defined as "an appearance of truth or reason, credible, 
believable, worthy of confidence." The Random House College 
2 Similar inconsistencies are also dealt with by the 
State unconvincingly. For example, the State defends Mrs. Rains' 
belated claim that she gave the name of Andy Quintana to police 
during the initial call reporting the crime, by pointing out that 
the police officers who stopped Mr. Quintana in the truck did not 
contradict Mrs. Rains responding only that they could not recall. 
Brief of Respondent at 20 n.7. That assertion is untenable because, 
had the police possessed the name of Mr. Quintana as the 
perpetrator, they would not have let him leave freely while 
impounding the vehicle (R. 118 at 47; R. 119 at 5, 13). The State 
also suggests that the inconsistency in clothing description is 
trivial because Mr. Quintana could have returned home and changed 
his shorts. Brief of Respondent at 20 n.6. That explanation is 
disputed by the record as the testimony disclosed that Mr. Quintana 
did not even own a pair of shorts fitting the description given by 
Mrs. Rains (R. 119 at 26). 
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Dictionary/ revised edition at 1018 (1984). When pressed on 
cross-examination, Mrs. Rains was unable to state with any 
specificity how she knew Mr. Quintana nor how she recognized the 
person on the porch of the John home as Mr. Quintana. See 
Addendum E of Appellant's Opening Brief to support that premise. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Rains' testimony is implausible because it lacks 
the appearance of truth or reason; it lacks credibility and 
believability and is unworthy of confidence. The State's attempt to 
explain away the inaccuracies of the testimony and to salvage the 
same as plausible is simply too demanding from this evidence. 
The evidence presented at trial is insufficient such that 
reasonable jurors must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Quintana committed the crimes for which he was convicted. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). This Court should 
accordingly remand the case to the district court with an order 
dismissing the charges against Mr. Quintana. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO. 19 TO THE JURY 
OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF MR. QUINTANA. 
Mr. Quintana relies on the arguments presented in his 
opening brief calling for reversal of the convictions on these 
grounds. Brief of Appellant at 24-32. Mr. Quintana responds 
briefly herein to indicate that the State's reliance on State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987), is inappropriate. Brief of 
Respondent at 27. The Court in Johnson relied on State v. Smith, 
726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986) to reach its decision. State v. Johnson, 
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745 P.2d at 456. Smith, however, is distinguishable from the 
present case. See argument in Opening Brief of Appellant, 
Point IIIB at 29-30. Mr. Quintana urges that State v. Turner, 736 
P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), rather than State v. Johnson, is 
controlling. See Opening Brief of Appellant, Point IIIB at 30-32. 
He, therefore, continues to urge reversal on the grounds asserted 
herein. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, 
Andrew R. Quintana, requests that this Court reverse his conviction 
and remand this case to the district court with an order dismissing 
the charges or requiring a new trial. ^ 
Respectfully submitted this / I ' day of June, 1989. 
^LYNN R. BROV*1 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
!HARD G. UDAY 
Attorney for Defendai ppellant 
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